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Abstract 
 
The example of the youth mobile phone market is used for pilot empirical testing of a model of 
consumers’ decision making, based on common features of consumer behaviour in mature 
markets of information and high technology products.  Firstly, we discuss the key properties 
of mature high technology markets which affect market behaviour and strategies. These 
properties include: established customer and provider bases; the elements of both 
oligopolistic and monopolistic competition; very short product life cycle; considerable 
product differentiation; and using product quality, versioning and price discrimination as 
planning and marketing tools.  Secondly, a model of consumers’ decision making in such 
markets is suggested on the assumption that a choice is to be made between the following 
options: to continue using the existing version of the product, to upgrade it with the current 
provider or to switch to another provider.  Product price, quality characteristics, switching 
costs and network effects are demonstrated to be the variables affecting consumers’ decisions 
and therefore, these variables should be considered by competing providers when they choose 
production and marketing strategies.  In conclusion, the results of the empirical study are 
discussed in the context of their possible application to other information and high technology 
markets.  
 
Keywords: Consumer Choice; Mature Markets; High Technology Product; Quality; 
Switching Costs; Network Effect.  
 
“To switch or not to switch that is the question…” 
1. Introduction and Key Concepts 
The dichotomy of consumer loyalty and propensity to switch between brands or providers is 
one of the important dimensions of mature markets of information and high technology 
products.   
 
We consider a market of information and high technology products as mature, where the 
potential for both new entrants and reasonable customer base growth have been largely 
exhausted.  This definition is consistent with the conventional understanding of the maturity 
of such markets (see, for example, Gallardo, 2003, and Iyer & Soberman, 2000). Mature high 
technology markets, in our opinion, require special attention due to an intrinsic paradox: 
product providers compete with earlier versions of their own products. Acquiring new 
customers in mature market is increasingly difficult.  Therefore, the remaining expedients for 
maintaining the existing level of operations, and for further growth, are limited.  Strategies 
include either convincing existing customers to upgrade to a newer product, or providing 
potential customers with incentives for switching from other brands or providers.  In such 
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markets, product providers need to develop distinct strategies, which allow them to compete 
effectively not only with their rivals, but with the earlier versions of their own products.  
  
The Australian market of mobile phone services is an example of such a mature high 
technology market. The mobile phone industry has been growing at an exponential rate in 
Australia over the last decade, and has now reached a stage of maturity where 77% of the 
population have a mobile phone (AMTA, 2004).  Therefore, further growth of existing firms, 
by acquiring new customers, is becoming increasingly difficult.  It is also difficult to launch a 
successful new mobile phone services business.   
 
The existing literature considers the mobile phone industry from multiple perspectives, 
including marketing (Grundstrom and Wilkinson, 2004), industrial organisation (Jonason, 
2002), defusion of innovations (Grundstrom and Wilkinson, 2004), sociological (Ling, 2000), 
usability of mobile technology and applications (Alanko et al, 1999; Barnes 2002).   In this 
paper we apply an interdisciplinary approach, combining economic theory with information 
technology research.  We use the example of mobile telephony industry for developing a 
model explaining consumer behaviour in mature high technology and information product 
markets.  Our approach is based on the assumption that in such markets, consumers face the 
choice between the following options:  
(1) To continue using the existing version of the product;  
(2) To upgrade it with the current provider; or  
(3) To switch to another provider.   
 
High technology and information markets are a special case with quite distinctive 
characteristics (Shapiro and Varian, 1999).  Switching costs, network effects, and customer 
lock-in mechanisms, in addition to price incentives, product utility and quality appear to be 
the factors influencing both consumer choice and firms’ competitive strategies in high 
technology markets, such as the market of mobile phone services.     
 
According to (Klemperer, 1978a, b, c, and 1989), consumer switching costs (CSCs) may 
include transaction, learning, artificial and contractual costs.  Transaction costs, as defined by 
Klemperer, are the costs that are incurred, by a consumer when ceasing a relationship with 
one supplier and switching to a rival brand.  Learning costs occur when the learning 
undertaken by a consumer to use one brand is not applicable to other brands.  The costs of 
switching, both in terms of lost productivity and money spent, may outweigh any perceived 
benefits.  Artificial costs are created by firms in order to increase customer loyalty. 
Contractual CSCs are induced by contracts that commit consumers to buy a product or to use 
a service from a firm for a particular period of time or for a particular number of purchases.   
 
The concept of the network effect has been established in the literature on infrastructure and 
utility sectors (Economides, 1996).  The network effect is a positive externality that occurs 
where the benefit consumers perceive to be available from using a product, depends on how 
many others use it (Van Hoose, 2003).  This concept has been applied to information and 
high-technology products in tandem with CSC (Farrell and Shapiro, 1988).  In particular, 
Shapiro & Varian (1999) believe, that the challenge for firms seeking to introduce new 
technology, that is not compatible with existing technology, is to build network size and thus 
overcome the combined CSC of all consumers.  This is, obviously, applicable to the 
emergence and growth of the mobile phone market.  
Generally, consumer lock-in is induced by a seller of good or service, and occurs where CSC 
are higher than the perceived benefit from using an alternate product (Van Hoose, 2003).  
840 
Zauberman (2003), who also discussed this concept, concluded that consumer lock-in tends to 
decrease consumers’ propensity to search and switch.  Zauberman suggested further that lock-
in occurs due to a consumer’s preference to minimise immediate costs and an underestimation 
of the impact of future CSC.  Shapiro & Varian (1999) categorised several types of lock-in, 
including durable purchases, loyalty programs, brand-specific training, the absence or 
insufficiency of tools for converting data into different formats, and others.   
 
As far as market structures and competition are concerned, the majority of literature devoted 
to switching costs, network effects, and customer lock-in mechanisms has been dealing with 
oligopolistic markets, where market power is exercised by competitors acquiring their market 
shares and affecting market prices, while innovations, product variety, quality, or upgrade are 
not predominant competitive tools.  Goods are assumed to be homogenous and each firm is 
assumed to possess some market power (e.g. Chen & Hitt, 2002, Elzinga & Mills, 1998, 
Farrell & Shapiro, 1988, Klemperer, 1987a,b,c, 1988, 1995, Valletti, 2000), allowing them to 
price at above marginal cost and obtain monopoly profits.   
 
In practice, the market structure of the mobile telephony in Australia, like many other markets 
of high technology and information products, displays features of both oligopolistic and 
monopolistic competition.  In this paper, we develop further the existing theory of network 
effects and CSC in oligopolistic markets, combining it with the model of monopolistic 
competition in the markets of high technology and information products (Kazakevitch and 
Torlina, 2003).  This combination allows the development of a new theoretical model of 
consumer behaviour in mature high technology and information product markets.  The model 
is applied to the youth mobile phone market in Australia.  
 
The remainder of this paper is structured as follows.  In the next section we describe the 
model, underlying assumptions, and the rationale for the inclusion of the factors, which 
underpin consumer behaviour in high technology and information markets.  In the following 
section we present some results of the quantification of the model and empirical tests. Firstly, 
we describe the observed features of consumer behaviour in the Australian youth mobile 
phone market. Secondly, we establish which factors influence consumer behaviour, and 
therefore, consumer demand and ranking of those factors. Finally, we discuss the results of 
the empirical study of the considered market, and the applicability of this approach to markets 
with similar structure. 
 
2. The Model 
We consider a market for an information technology product that satisfies the conventional 
properties of monopolistic competition; and combine those properties with some of the 
features of oligopolistic competition (See Varian and Varian, 1984; Jehle, 1991).  Also, we 
consider the assumptions related to competition for customers, as well as to consumer choice 
in mature high technology and information product markets (Kazakevitch and Torlina, 2003).  
Finally, we specify the factors affecting consumer choice in the market of mobile phone 
services.        
 
The suggested model is based on the following assumptions: 
• The market consists of several competing profit maximizing firms.  Each of the firms 
possesses a visible market share, and therefore, exercises some market power; 
• Each of the firms produces more than one product variant, with differentiated  
features;  
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• The products, produced by all the firms, are viewed by the buyers as close though not 
perfect substitutes for one another;   
• The differences between the products are viewed by consumers as perceived 
differences in product quality and utility characteristics;   
• Each of the sellers can be considered as the monopolist of its particular product variant 
with a limited degree of monopoly power;   
• Such a monopolist enjoys a monopoly power and making economic profit during only 
a short period of time from the introduction of a unique product, technology or feature 
until they becomes available to rivals, or until a new “more innovative” product is 
introduced by this monopolist or by a rival;  
• To prolong monopoly power, the firms utilize competitive techniques, which are not 
directly embodied in the utility or quality of product.  Those techniques may include 
price discrimination, as well as switching costs, network effect, and consumer lock-in 
inducements; 
• The market is mature: new entries are difficult to pursue; the overall number of 
consumers is not considerably increasing, therefore, the existing firms mostly compete 
for existing customers by introducing new product variants and new price/cost 
incentives; the firms attempt to convince their own customers to upgrade to their new 
products, and competitors’ customers to switch from competitors to their products;  
• Consumers make their decision based on the following alternatives:  they either stay, 
for the time being, with the current version of the product; or upgrade it with the 
current provider; or upgrade it with a different provider.   
 
                                                               Figure 1. A Model of a Mature Market of an  
                                             Information or High Technology Product 
 
Market interaction 
between competitive 
firms and consumers 
can be represented by 
the following model 
(Figure 1).   Having 
exhausted the revenue 
flow out of the sales 
of existing products, 
each of the firms 
introduces new 
product variants.  The 
new product variants 
are distinguished by 
increased product 
utility and/or improved quality characteristics.   Those improvements may or may not affect 
the price of the new product variant.  The firms may utilise and/or induce switching costs for 
the existing customers, who may be willing, otherwise, to upgrade their product with a 
different provider.   
 
In the industries which naturally generate network externalities, such as computer networking 
and telecommunications, the firms can further amplify the network effect.  Network 
incentives can be introduced based on new technologies (such as 3G telephony) and/or on 
cost incentives offered to members of the same network (such as discounts on calls of the 
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same mobile phone provider’s customers communicating with each other).   The firms also 
pursue reducing switching costs for the customers, who may be willing to switch to their 
services from other providers.   
 
Consumers make their choice, based on the information regarding all the products available 
on the market with a view to all of the above-mentioned factors: utility; quality; price; 
switching costs; and network externalities.  As a result, during each period of the time 
consumer population forms three “behavioural” categories: (1) “loyalists” upgrading with the 
same provider; (2) “non-loyalists” switching to a different provider” and (3) “non-upgrading 
loyalists”.   The earlier two categories constitute effective consumer demand. 
 
3. Consumer Behaviour in the Australian Youth Mobile Phone Market: 
Quantification of the Model and Some Empirical Results 
In this study, we are interested in the highlighted “consumer choice” segment of the model 
(Figure 1) with application to the youth mobile phone market.  In other words, we address the 
question: how do the listed factors affect consumer strategy with regard to upgrading to a new 
version/brand of the product.   The decision whether to upgrade mobile phone products with 
the same provider, or to switch to another provider, or not to go for an upgrade for the time 
being, is considered as the dependant variable of the model specified for the mobile telephony 
market.  Factors affecting consumer choice are treated as independent variables.  They are 
specified in Table 1. 
 
Table 1.  Factors of Consumer Choice in the Mobile Phone Market 
 
Product 
Utility 
Factors 
(PUF) 
  
1. Overall importance of the product utility factor  
2. Benefits and costs of a new mobile phone package are considered. 
3. The positive decision on upgrade (and switching) is made only if      
benefits out-weight costs.  
Product 
Price 
Factors 
(PPF) 
1. Overall importance of the price factor  
2. Price is an important factor of decision making 
3. Prices for all the packages available on the market are compared before a 
decision on upgrading is made. 
4. Price of upgrade is prohibitive 
Consumer 
Switching 
Costs (CSC) 
1. Overall importance of the switching cost factor 
2. Consumer fears being locked into the current contract 
3. The time and effort required for learning how to use a new product is 
taken into account. 
4. The cost of ‘breaking’ a current mobile phone contract is perceived as 
prohibitive  
5. The offer of a financial incentive to switch to a different provider is 
persuasive  
6. Switching from the contract to the pre-paid option (or from the pre-paid to 
the contract option) is considered.   
7. The offer of an additional non-phone related gift is persuasive  
8. The potential of a discount at retail outlets is important. 
9. The opportunity to trade in an old handset for cash is an important factor 
affecting the consumer’s decision 
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Network 
Effect 
Factor (NE) 
1. Overall importance of the network factor 
2. SMS entertainment updates on my mobile are an important (was an  
important) factor affecting my purchase decision 
3. Receiving sport and video highlights on a mobile phone is important 
4. Discounted calls to nominated friends and relatives 
5. The chosen mobile phone package was recommended to me by an 
acquaintance  
6. The reputation of the brand is taken into account 
7. The compatibility of the consumer’s phone features with that of 
Friends/family is an important factor affecting purchase decisions 
Product 
Quality/ 
Features 
Factor 
1.Overall importance of the handset specific quality factors (QHS) 
1.1 Built in camera 
1.2 Built in video camera 
1.3 Internet access 
1.4 Additional accessories (such as car kit)  
2.Overall importance of the plan/product specific financial factors (PSFF) 
2.1 Cap on monthly bill 
2.2 Increased discounts in return for increased  contract length 
2.3 The opportunity to ‘roll over’ unused free monthly calls 
2.4 A designated number of free SMS per month per recharge card 
2.5 A designated number of free calls per month per recharge card 
2.6 A designated time of day to make free calls 
 
For the purpose of the quantification of the model, a structured questionnaire with fixed 
alternatives and Likert scale answers was developed.  The survey was conducted on a pilot 
size sample.  The population, which this study is based on, is the Australian youth mobile 
phone market.  For the purposes of the study, “youth” is defined as all aged between 18 and 
30.  “Market” is defined as all those, within the age range, who own a mobile phone, as well 
as those considering purchasing a mobile phone.  The sample type selected for this pilot stage 
of the study is a non-representative convenience sample.  The sample consists of 120 
university students approached on campus over a period of one week. The justification for the 
sample size is that such a size is sufficiently large for the purposes of parametric statistical 
analysis in general, and discriminant analysis in particular. 
 
Discriminant analysis has been applied to establish a relationship between the independent 
variables (factors), in terms of their relative importance, and dependant variables (the decision 
by consumers with regard to upgrade and loyalty).  Generally, this statistical tool allows for 
studying the difference between two or more groups of cases in the sample, determining 
simultaneously whether meaningful differences exist between the groups, and identifying the 
discriminating power of each variable (Klecka, 1980).  One way of describing group 
differences is to compute the Fisher’s linear combination coefficients, or a weighted sum of 
independent variables.  The weights, obtained for each of the variables indicate, how much or 
how little each factor contributes, positively or negatively, to the differentiation between the 
groups.  The ‘Test of equality of Group Means’ indicates whether or not there is a statistically 
significant difference between the responses of the three groups.  The ‘Wilks' Lambda’, 
computed for each independent variable, further indicates if there is a significant difference 
among groups across all the independent variables. The overall Wilks’ Lambda indicates that 
there is a significant difference among groups across all independent variables, if the 
significance level is below 0.1.  Finally, the ‘Classification Function Coefficients’ are the 
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actual coefficients of the Fisher’s linear discriminant functions, ranking the relative 
importance of independent variables for discriminated groups.   
 
Two variants of the model were constructed.  In the first one, the aggregate model, consumer 
behaviour in the youth mobile phone market was analysed as a function of aggregate factors, 
as they are shown in Figure 1, with the exception of the “Quality” factor.  Two aggregate 
factors related to Quality are considered.  One integrates the handset quality/features, the 
other one integrates the overall importance of the financial factors built into a contract or 
prepaid mobile phone product.  In the second, the detailed model, instead of the aggregated 
factors, the disaggregated factors (see the right column in Table 1) are discriminated by the 
three groups of customers, to explain the difference in decision making between the groups. 
 
3.1 The Aggregate Factors of Consumer Choice 
The aggregate model, that discriminates the groups of customers with respect to the above-
mentioned aggregate decision making factors, indicated an overall significant difference 
between the groups (Wilks' Lambda Significance level below 0.1).  Of the aggregate factors 
taken into consideration, the Product Utility (PUF), Product Price (PPF) and Handset 
Specific Factors (QHF) demonstrate statistically significant differences between the three 
groups. These factors hold different importance in the decision making processes of the three 
groups of customers.  The differences between the groups with regard to the aggregate 
Consumer Switching Costs (CSC), Network Effect (NE), and Product Specific Financial 
Factors (PSFF) appear to be statistically insignificant (Table 2). 
 
Table 2. Tests of Equality of Group Means for the Aggregate Model 
 
 Wilks' Lambda Chi-square Sig. 
Test of Function .773 28.919 .004 
 
Test of Variables Wilks' Lambda F Sig. 
Overall importance of PUF .873 8.364 .000 
Overall importance of PPF .932 4.226 .017 
Overall importance of CSC .991 .525 .593 
Overall importance of NE .962 2.259 .109 
Overall importance of QHS .932 4.206 .017 
Overall importance of PSFF .967 1.992 .141 
 
Ranking the relative importance of the independent variables for discriminated groups has 
indicated that Product Price Factor (PPF) appears to be the most important for all three 
groups of customers, followed by Product Specific Financial Factors (PSFF). Product 
Utility (PUF) and Network Effect (NE) factors also have the same rank among all three 
groups of customers.  Differences between the groups’ ranking appear to be noticeable only 
with regard to the overall less important Consumer Switching Costs (CSC) and Quality 
Handset (QHF) factors (Table 3).    
 
The analysis indicates that market price of the product, “value for money”, and attractive 
financial services and discounts strongly dominate the decision making in all three groups of 
customers.  The other factors, such as additional services enhancing social interaction, 
incentives and inconveniencies of switching between providers, and the novelty features of 
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new products are of less importance. Interestingly, though, the factors which seem to be of 
lowest priority in the decision making process appear to be real group differentiators. “Loyal 
upgrading” customers rank “novelty features” of a new product as relatively more important 
than “inconveniency of changing product”.  ”Loyal non-upgrading“ customers demonstrate a 
more conservative approach, indicating that their decisions are based on “inconveniency of 
switching products” which prevails over obtaining “novelty features”. The third group, 
“Disloyal“ customers, indicates that overall “incentives to switch to a new provider” are more 
attractive then the “novelty features” of the current provider’s products. In terms of 
managerial relevance and focus of the strategic approach, further analysis is required in order 
to develop strategies allowing product providers to reduce or neutralize factors leading to the 
incentives to switch providers. 
 
Table 3.  Classification Function Coefficients and Ranks for the Aggregate Factors 
 
Groups of customers 
Group 1.  
Have not 
purchased 
recently, not 
upgrading 
Group 2.  
Upgrading with 
the same provider 
Group 3. 
 Upgrading with a 
different provider 
Aggregate Factors Coeff. Rank Coeff. Rank Coeff. Rank 
Overall importance of PUF 2.879 3 3.425 3 3.515 3 
Overall importance of PPF 7.225 1 7.110 1 6.745 1 
Overall importance of CSC 1.508 5 .698 6 1.071 5 
Overall importance of NE 1.752 4 2.236 4 2.026 4 
Overall importance of QHS .647 6 1.005 5 .742 6 
Overall importance of QFF 4.559 2 4.913 2 4.933 2 
 
3.2 The Detailed Factors of Consumer Choice 
The picture is not complete without considering ranking and differences between the 
customer groups with regard to detailed consumer choice factors.    
 
As in the case of the aggregate model, the detailed model shows, that the overall difference 
between the groups is statistically significant (Wilks' Lambda Significance Level below 0.1).   
 
In Table 4, the list of detailed variables is clustered in two areas. The first one includes the 
variables, with regard to which the difference between the groups of customers is significant. 
Factors in this group have different impact on the decision making process of different 
categories of customers (non-upgrading loyalists, upgrading loyalists, and “switching” 
customers).   
 
The second consists of variables representing insignificant differences in the perceived 
importance of the factors in the decision making process of the three groups of customers.  
Fifteen of the detailed variables have a significance level above 0.1 indicating that these 
variables do not discriminate between the groups. They might be either equally unimportant 
or equally important to each group. Nevertheless, they all contribute to the determination of 
the consumer preferences in each of the groups.  In a similar fashion to the case of the 
aggregate model, the overall significance level is less than 0.1, indicating that the difference 
between the groups of customers is significant.    
 
846 
 
Table 4. Tests of Equality of Group Means for the Detailed Model 
 
 Wilks' Lambda Chi-square Sig. 
Test of Function .415 88.861 .006 
 
Test of Variables  Wilks' Lambda F Sig. 
 Statistically significant difference (Sig<0.1) 
Benefits of purchasing outweigh costs .849 10.220 .000 
Sports video highlights .887 7.349 .001 
Costs of upgrade prohibitive .911 5.634 .005 
SMS entertainment updates .918 5.151 .007 
Built in camera .928 4.433 .014 
Financial incentive to switch .931 4.284 .016 
Price is important factor .937 3.857 .024 
Free calls .937 3.837 .024 
Internet access .945 3.317 .040 
Free SMS's .947 3.233 .043 
Built in video .948 3.184 .045 
Cap on monthly bill .950 3.031 .052 
Brand reputation .957 2.602 .078 
Discount calls with min. length contract .958 2.498 .087 
  Statistically insignificant difference (Sig>0.1) 
Will consider all packages on market .965 2.110 .126 
Phone related gifts .968 1.901 .154 
Trade in old handset for cash .971 1.701 .187 
Time taken to learn considered .974 1.555 .216 
Feel I am locked-in to contract .984 .964 .384 
Discount calls with friends on network .984 .960 .386 
Recommended by acquaintance .986 .812 .447 
Cost of breaking contract prohibitive .990 .578 .563 
Discounts at retail outlets .990 .558 .574 
Designated time of day for free calls .991 .539 .585 
Roll-over of unused free calls .992 .474 .624 
Phone compatibility .993 .409 .665 
Switch from prepaid to contract etc. .995 .262 .770 
Consider costs and benefits .997 .165 .848 
Additional non-phone related gifts .999 .033 .968 
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Table 5 represents the classification function coefficients of the detailed model as well as the 
corresponding ratings for all three groups of customers.  Two kinds of ratings are considered. 
One of them shows the relative importance of variables within each of the aggregate factors.  
The other one is the overall rating across all the detailed variables. 
 
Table 5.  Classification Function Coefficients and Ranks for the Detailed Factors 
Consumer 
Groups 
Group 1. 
Have Not Purchased 
Recently, not Upgrading 
Group 2.   
Upgrading with the Same 
Provider 
Group 3. 
Upgrading with a Different 
Provider 
Factors Coeff. 
Rank 
within 
Aggr. 
Factor 
Over- 
all 
Rating 
Coeff. 
Rank 
within 
Aggr. 
Factor 
Over- 
all 
Rating 
Coeff. 
Rank 
within 
Aggr. 
Factor 
Over- 
all 
Rating 
Product Utility Factors (PUF) 
Consider costs 
and benefits  3.754 2 6 3.858 2 6 4.091 2 7 
Benefits of 
purchasing 
outweigh costs 
3.986 1 5 4.728 1 2 4.725 1 5 
Product Price Factors (PPF) 
Price is 
important 
factor 
5.729 1 1 5.361 1 1 5.523 1 2 
Will consider 
all packages on 
market 
.605 3 17 .336 3 18 .552 3 16 
Price of 
upgrade 
prohibitive 
5.155 2 2 4.572 2 4 4.774 2 4 
Consumer Switching Cost Factors (CSC) 
Fear I am 
locked-in to 
contract 
1.276 4 13 1.034 4 14 1.701 3 12 
Time taken to 
learn 
considered 
-.296 7 21 -.683 7 25 -.012 6 18 
Cost of 
breaking 
contract 
prohibitive 
-.818 8 24 -.894 8 27 -1.042 8 25 
Financial 
incentive to 
switch 
2.356 1 8 1.613 2 10 2.461 1 8 
Switch from 
prepaid to 
contract etc. 
1.262 3 14 1.647 1 9 1.391 4 13 
Additional 
non-phone 
related gifts 
-.293 6 19 -.211 6 20 -.110 7 19 
Discounts at 
retail outlets .935 5 15 .550 5 17 .072 5 17 
Trade in old 
handset for 
cash 
1.903 2 10 1.125 3 12 1.836 2 10 
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Network Effect Factors (NE) 
SMS 
entertainment 
updates 
-.676 4 22 -.291 5 21 -.585 4 21 
Sports video 
highlights 4.712 1 3 4.638 1 3 5.588 1 1 
Discount calls 
with friends on 
network 
-1.154 6 28 -.130 4 19 -.628 5 22 
Recommended 
by 
acquaintance 
1.863 2 11 .980 3 15 1.717 2 11 
Brand 
reputation .688 3 16 1.081 2 13 -.121 3 20 
Phone 
compatibility -1.013 5 26 -.486 6 24 -.865 6 24 
Handset Specific Quality Factors (QHS) 
Built in camera .579 2 18 1.298 2 11 .814 2 15 
Built in video 
-.713 3 23 -1.545 4 28 -1.570 4 29 
Internet access -1.020 4 27 -.794 3 26 -.800 3 23 
Phone related 
gifts 2.189 1 9 2.323 1 8 1.976 1 9 
Plan/Product Specific Financial Factors (PSF) 
Cap on 
monthly bill 1.340 3 12 .862 3 16 .848 3 14 
Discount calls 
with min. 
length contract 
-2.446 6 29 -2.185 6 29 -1.292 6 28 
Roll-over of 
unused free 
calls 
-.937 5 25 -.363 4 22 -1.154 4 26 
Free SMS -.672 4 21 -.386 5 23 -1.194 5 27 
Free calls 3.594 2 7 3.820 2 7 4.798 1 3 
Designated 
time of day for 
free calls 
4.539 1 4 4.425 1 5 4.324 2 6 
 
 
The results, obtained using the detailed model, generally confirm the conclusions of the 
classification of the aggregate variables.  The most important factor affecting the consumer 
behaviour of the considered category mobile phone customers is the Price (PPF). 
 
Within the second important category of Product Specific Financial Factors (PSF) all three 
groups of customers highly value such features as Designated Time of Day for Free Calls, 
Free Calls Allowance, and Cap on Monthly Bills.  The other three variables within this 
aggregate factor appear to be at the bottom of the list.  
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Within the Network Effects (NE) category the following factors appear to be significant 
influences on customer choice: Brand Reputation; Recommendation by Acquaintance; and 
Sports Video Highlights. The rest of the factors in this category, including Phone 
Compatibility, and SMS Entertainment Updates are less significant for consumer decision 
making. 
 
Both incentives and obstacles are considered within the Switching Costs factor category 
(CSC).  Understandably, the attitudes of the customer groups are rather different with regard 
to the Switching Costs.  “Non-upgrading” and “switching” customers consider financial 
incentives, as well as the opportunity of trading in the old handset for cash, as the most 
important reasons for making a decision “to switch” or “not to switch” between providers.  
The dilemma of switching between prepaid and contract types of service looks the most 
important for loyal customers. All the customers see “lock in” as an important disincentive to 
switch.  Time taken to learn how to use a new handset is not seen as a major obstacle.  Nor are 
additional non-phone related gifts considered a major incentive.  
 
Finally, the detailed analysis of the Handset Specific Quality Factors (QHS) confirms findings 
from the aggregate model about the lowest importance of those factors. Of the QHS factors, 
only Phone-Related Gifts appear to be a distinctively more important sub-factor. 
 
The overall conclusions from the detailed model confirm more precisely the conclusions 
derived from the aggregate model.  The financial variables such as Price, Plan/Product 
Specific Financial Factors, the financial components of Consumer Switching Costs and 
Network Effects are more important for consumer decision making than the technological 
components of product differentiation.  An interpretation of this phenomenon can be 
attempted from both the consumer population/sample and market structure perspectives.  On 
the one hand, research on the youth segment of mobile telephony consumers and the 
convenience sample of on-campus students might pre-determine the financial consideration to 
be dominant for decision making under hard budget constraints.  On the other hand, pricing 
and financial incentives to customers appear to be more powerful competitive tools, than 
technological innovations.  This can be seen as indicative of the maturity of the industry in a 
further sense, in addition to the definition given in the introduction to this paper.  Not only has 
the ability to increase the overall number of consumers been exhausted, the feasibility of new 
entries has become limited in the case of the mobile phone industry, but one can conclude that 
the attractiveness of rapidly progressing technological innovations has been diminishing.  
New features are immediately becoming uniform across the industry. This may be the reason 
why technological product differentiation appears to be a less important factor; and the type 
of competition is becoming closer to oligopoly rather than monopolistic competition. 
 
4. Conclusion 
In conclusion, we discuss the results of the study, and possible further applications of the 
findings.  
 
Firstly, we have developed a model which incorporates new factors in an extended consumer 
demand analysis framework in relation to information and high technology products.  A 
particular market structure always creates a supply side environment for consumer decision-
making.  The mature high technology market structure is a special case, with quite distinctive 
producer competition and consumer behaviour characteristics.  As discussed earlier, in such 
markets, product quality, represented by a bundle of product features and services, network 
externalities and consumer switching costs, becomes increasingly important in producer and 
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consumer market strategies, in addition to traditional market determinants.  In this paper, we 
have presented a model of a mature market of high technology or information product, where 
traditional market determinants of utility and price have been complemented by quality, 
network effects, and switching costs.  
 
Secondly, we have discussed the results of an empirical study of one such market.  A 
questionnaire has been developed, and data collected to support quantifying the “consumer 
choice” segment of the model with application to the Australian youth mobile phone market.  
The study has supported an analysis that distinguishes between three groups of mobile 
telephony customers, identifying the differences in their buying behaviour and their decision 
making patterns.  We have also investigated the ranking, by different customer groups, of 
both aggregated factors and the sub-factors underlying the aggregated factors.   
 
Thirdly, we believe, the suggested approach might be applied to other markets with similar 
structures.  In particular, we envisage application of the proposed methodology to mature 
markets of specialised software products, such as data management tools, accounting, 
mathematical and other professional packages.   
 
A consequence of constructing and quantifying the model is that it allows the analysis of 
consumer decision making factors in a particular type of market.  Where the context and the 
factors affecting a specific market are identified, the suggested approach provides a tool for 
ranking each of the factors and sub-factors.  This allows a researcher to analyse and compare 
their relative importance, with a focus on consumer demand determination for a high 
technology product.  
 
As demonstrated in the earlier sections of this paper, this approach can be used for the 
analysis of market structures of mature markets of information high technology products, as 
well as for practical decision making and strategy formulating by both consumers and 
producers. However, the concept itself, and especially the implementation discussed in this 
paper, are not free of limitations.  In particular, a more representative sample, capturing the 
demographic dimension of analysis, is desirable for more conclusive results with regard to the 
Australian youth mobile telephony market.  Groups of customers representing different age 
groups or different income categories might have enriched this study, by enabling new 
dimensions for analysis and interpretation of results. 
 
Finally, we envisage further development of this study in the following two directions: (i) 
moving from discriminant function and ranking to quantifying parameters of actual market 
demand functions; and (ii) quantifying the whole model, including the supply side.  We 
believe that game theory, together with experimental economics tools, would provide a most 
realistic and effective way to progress this study further. 
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